**Title**: The Philosophical Psychology of Charles S. Peirce. On the connection between perception, reason, and the logic of scientific inquiry

**Abstract**: This paper examines the work of Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) in light of his life-long interest in experimental psychology. Charles S. Peirce is known mostly for his work in logic and throughout his life he identified as a logician. Yet, our understanding of his logic of science would not be complete without an understanding of his theory of perception and its relation to reasoning. In 1860, Charles S. Peirce was a rising star in the quickly-developing North American scientific landscape, but he did not survive its institutional aftershocks. By 1884, he had lost his academic affiliation and would soon lose his place in the U.S. Geodetic and Coast Survey. Still, his work brings to light a host of methodological discussions around experimental psychology and the nature of perception, the latter’s relationship with reason, and their role in nineteenth-century philosophy of science more broadly. In my paper, I show how Peirce clung to an inferential theory of perception, initially proposed by Wilhelm Wundt (1862, 1863), even after Wundt rejected it, and how this theory prompted Peirce to design, in 1884, one of the most methodologically advanced experiments in psychology of his time.