**Lesions and Persons: Decomposition and Localization in the Space of Reasons**

Neuropsychology and neurology are distinctive among the neurosciences in engaging the whole person, not merely their parts or the parts of their bodies. The methods in these sciences can be used to drop tethering lines between person-level differences and the differences in lower-level cognitive and neural systems thought to explain them. I will explicate two minimal inference forms these sciences mobilize: differential symptom description and dissociation. Specifically, I reconstruct a distinctive use of these inference methods, not as tools of localization, nor as part of the task of lumping and splitting in cognitive ontology, but rather as components in upward-looking argument forms about how capacities figure in the lives of the person. So conceived, I’ll argue, many of the standard objections to case-study and lesion methods fall by the wayside.

In our co-authored book (*Living without Memory),* Shayna Rosenbaum and I use these basic argument forms to explore how the loss of episodic memory in people with episodic amnesia does (and does not) influence a variety of person-level competencies (prominently, the understanding of manifest time, the capacity for moral reflection, and maintenance of a serviceable sense of and conception of one’s self). So understood, these familiar bits of the mechanist’s inferential arsenal can be redeployed to investigate how remembrance does and does not contribute to the lives distinctive of persons, linking the personal and sub-personal without departing the standard mechanistic paradigm of explanation int the neurosciences.